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Introduction
The level of competition in the Italian
banking system has intensified as monetary and
financial flows have become more internation-
al in nature. The increased integration of coun-
tries into the EU dramatically changed the com-
petitive landscape for banks and financial
institutions across the continent, resulting in
dynamic changes for the Italian banking sys-
tem. In the past ten years, legislation intended
to redefine bank ownership and operation
transformed this historically regulated and pro-
tected system. With their newfound “freedom,”
Italian banks are in a position to catch up to the
financial institutions of the most advanced
European financial centers. Italian banks also
have been strengthened by a series of structur-
al changes such as consolidation through merg-
ers and acquisitions, improvements in man-
agerial methods and enhanced operational
processes. However, in order to become com-
petitive, the industry must deal with issues of
ownership, performance and product offerings.
Conventional wisdom suggests that European
banks will face a period of consolidation, even-
tually leaving only five to ten mega-banks on
the continent. This article considers whether
or not Italian banks are up to the challenge of
European and international competition. The
fundamental question I investigate is: Do Italian
banks have the highly specialized expertise
needed to compete successfully in global finan-
cial markets? I describe and discuss the histor-
ical ownership structure of the industry with
special reference to issues of deregulation, pri-
vatization and consolidation. I then evaluate the
industry’s current position and provide com-
ment on its future.
Historical Ownership Structure
The Banking Law of 1936 and policies pur-
sued by the Bank of Italy (Italy’s central bank)
created a set of regulations to protect the bank-
ing system from instability and market failure.
The industry was subject to strong government
intervention, with close to 70% of bank assets
under public control. (“Italy’s Banking System”)
Public ownership helped banks fund public
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interests, such as supporting the growth of spe-
cific sectors or regions and providing credit to
small firms that otherwise would be rationed
by profit maximizing entities. Additionally, the
strict regulations included total control of entry
and exit as well as control over branching deci-
sions, with few banks allowed to operate at the
regional or national level. The end result of
these regulations was a proliferation of small
local banks, with few concerns over profitabil-
ity or performance issues. Given limited com-
petition, individual banks could be profitable
without being particularly efficient and with-
out having to pursue aggressive market strate-
gies. Despite high costs, banks were able to
achieve high profit levels due to the unusually
wide spread between lending and borrowing
rates. In short, limited competition allowed
banks to offload their high costs onto prices
borne by consumers. 
Deregulation and Privatization
Although the Italian government began
deregulation of the financial system signifi-
cantly later than others in Europe, the indus-
try has quickly adapted to the new environ-
ment. The passing of the Amato Law in 1990
reduced the political influence of the state by
encouraging government-owned public sector
banks to change their corporate status from
trusts, foundations and associations to joint-
stock corporations. Public entities that owned
the joint-stock corporations were encouraged
to place as much as 49% of their equity with
private shareholders. (“Banks & Other Financial
Institutions”) Since the Amato Law, there has
been a switch from a banking industry domi-
nated by banks under public control to a bank-
ing industry where the major role is played by
private legal entities. 
Furthermore, the Bank of Italy deregulat-
ed branching by relaxing the guidelines for new
branches. As a result, 8,000 new branches began
operation between 1989 and 1995. This
increased the size of the branching network for
more than 70% of Italian banks. (Cerasi et al)
The Banking Law of 1993 (Teso Unico Bancario)
allowed for further geographic and sectional
deregulation, lowered entry barriers and
branching constraints, increased private own-
ership and set the tone for a series of consoli-
dation efforts. The main objective of the law 
was to increase competition in the banking 
sector and integration in the European 
banking industry.
A renaissance of the Italian banking indus-
try began as massive privatizations occurred
during the past decade. The share of total assets
held by banks controlled by the state or other
public institutions decreased from 68% in 1992
to 12% in 2000. (“OECD Economic Surveys”)
However, an oddity of the current structure is
that many Italian banks are not owned by insti-
tutional investors under pressure to produce
returns, rather by charitable foundations. The
origins of bank foundations lie in the public-
sector banks that historically dominated Italian
banking. When banks were required by the
Amato Law to spin off their banking activities
into joint-stock corporations, ownership of the
shares went to newly established charitable
foundations. The law required income from
bank operations to be allocated for education,
culture, health care, conservation, scientific
research or aid to the disadvantaged. But new
guidelines have been established in recent years
to encourage foundations to give up control. A
reform introduced in 2002 set guidelines for the
fiscal and civil status of bank foundations and
the fiscal treatment of bank restructuring oper-
ations. In the past, foundation divestiture often
was completed through a merger with a larger
private bank, reducing the foundation’s hold-
ings to minority status in the merged entity.
The 2002 law calls for a compete withdrawal of
foundations from the banking business, leaving
the management of their investment portfolios
to independent trusts. Under this new owner-
ship structure, foundations give up their abili-
ty to exercise control over the operations of
banks. This must be accomplished by June 2006
if foundations wish to maintain the status of a
private nonprofit institution and maintain the
fiscal benefits associated with taking on the
legal status of a non-mercantile institution.
(“OECD Economic Surveys”)  Privatization is
not complete, as the nonprofit foundations con-
tinue to directly or indirectly control 20 banks,
including Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
(MPS), one of Italy’s largest. Partial privatiza-
tion causes issues in the industry’s competitive
13
position. Because the foundations are not sub-
ject to market forces, there is concern over their
ability to contribute to effective capital alloca-
tion in the banking system. The purpose of
excluding foundations from the sector is to
enable banks to compete more successfully in
the European and international financial are-
nas.
Consolidation
Another contributing factor to the chang-
ing structure of the Italian banking system is
the consolidation efforts through mergers and
acquisitions. Between 1990 and 2001, the num-
ber of banks decreased steadily (Table 1).
Reasons for consolidation include the need to
cut costs, manage risk, broaden product offer-
ings, gain access to information and proprietary
technologies, increase market power and extend
geographic coverage. In some cases, acquiring
another bank to increase size also may be a
defensive strategy if it helps reduce the likeli-
hood of becoming victim to a hostile takeover.
However, the most widely cited motive for bank
mergers in recent years is the desire to gain
improved performance through achieving cost
synergies. (Goddard et al) The largest banking
groups all have been formed through consoli-
dation and currently are in the process of inter-
nal reorganization; they include IntesaBCI,
UniCredito Italiano, San Paolo IMI, MPS and
Banca di Roma. According to the Bank of Italy,
the domestic market share of the five largest
Italian banks accounted for 29% of total assets
in 1995 and rose to 54% by the end of 2001.
Although the degree of concentration has risen
significantly, the banking system remains frag-
mented with a multitude of smaller institutions
sharing the rest of the market. This allows room
for further consolidation within the industry.
Mergers and acquisitions are not limited to top-
tier banks. Many of them have been in the form
of link-ups among regional banks, creating
super-regional players. 
Once restricted to local and regional
expansion, Italian banks now are able to con-
solidate along the north-south axis, with a large
number of northern banks spreading to the
south to acquire locally based banks. The 
rationale behind this strategy is finding new
market shares as an alternative to the over-
branched north, leveraging on the acquired
banks’ large base of deposits and containing
costs of acquisitions. More than 80% of deposits
in the south are intermediated directly or
through southern subsidiaries from banks
based in the central-north regions. (“Bank
Industry Risk Analysis”)  
To respect local sensitivities, many of the
mergers have been implemented using a “fed-
eral” model. The new groups are formed by a
holding company and various bank subsidiaries,
which maintain their own name and distribu-
tion channels. This structure allows the local
bank to retain its identity and operations while
being a subsidiary within a larger bank.
However, some groups that have adopted the
federal structure have recently turned to a
straight merger solution in order to remove
inefficiencies and optimize synergies.
Regulation
The Interministerial Committee for Credit
and Savings (CICR), the Ministry of Treasury
and the Bank of Italy regulate the Italian bank-
ing system. The primary objectives of these
organizations are to maintain sound bank man-
agement; ensure overall stability, efficiency and
competitiveness of the financial system; and
comply with banking legislation. The Bank of
Italy’s role has evolved into one of a central
bank. Its functions include note issuance, bank-
ing and financial supervision, market oversight,
safeguarding competition in the credit market
and, jointly with the European Central Bank
(ECB), oversight of payment systems. Another
main responsibility of the Bank of Italy is to
adopt regulations and implement policies for-
mulated by the CICR and the ECB. Since 1998,
Italy also has incorporated all EU banking direc-
tives into its legislation. 
According to the Bank of International
Settlements, the Basel Committee on Banking
1The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a com-
mittee of banking supervisory authorities, established by
the central bank governors of the G-10 countries in 1975.
It consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory
authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States.
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Supervision1 currently is working on proposals
for major reforms to the 1988 Basel Capital
Accord. The original Basel Accord was an agree-
ment among the G-10 central banks to apply
common minimum capital standards to their
banking industries by year-end 1992. If imple-
mented, the new Basel Capital Accord’s (Basel
II’s) proposals represent a major advance in the
current supervisory approach to capital and will
be an improved alignment of risk and regula-
tory capital requirements. Bank managers are
trying to accomplish three objectives with Basel
II: bring capital charges closer to the banks’
own measures of risk; establish a continuous
review of banks’ management, and especially of
their risk management, as a factor in adjusting
the capital charge; and create incentives for
greater public disclosure of a bank’s risk expo-
sures. These standards, which focus on address-
ing credit risk (the main risk incurred by
banks), will help Italian banks allocate credit
more effectively. This is especially important
because overall credit risk is expected to rise in
2003 as midsized and family-owned enterpris-
es that form the backbone of the Italian econ-
omy begin to weaken as a result of global eco-
nomic pressures. (“Bank Industry Risk
Analysis”) However, banks have a substantial
amount of work to do in order to have their
internal rating systems ready in time. They also
will face significant challenges in meeting the
operational risk standards because the quality
of many credit rating systems will need to be
significantly upgraded. These rules allow for
significant national discretion, which runs the
risk of regulators introducing or reinforcing
competitive inequalities as a result of differ-
ences in implementation and supervision. In
addition, these rules will likely burden banks
with extra costs. There is a fear that smaller
Italian banks may not be equipped to rate the
companies to which they lend, causing them to
be disadvantaged against the national and inter-
national players. 
Current Financial Position
Through structural changes such as pri-
vatization and consolidation, banks within Italy
are becoming more competitive. The current
banking system is characterized by:
1) A highly intermediated market
where banks still enjoy a leading
role in the economy
2) A retail banking business where the
majority of clients are individuals
and small businesses
3) Mainly domestic activity with little 
business generated from abroad and 
low penetration of foreign banks
4) Strong presence of regional banks
with solid customer relationships
Overall data suggest that Italian banks are
economically sound. With structural reforms,
enhanced managerial techniques and increased
efficiencies, Italian banks have proved their
resilience to turmoil in global financial mar-
kets. Because capital markets continue to be
poorly developed in Italy, the banking system
enjoys a leading role in the economy due to its
high level of intermediation carried out on
behalf of the large number of small and mid-
sized companies.2 However, the increasing
squeeze on interest margins in recent years
caused lower interest rates and has led to a
series of measures intended to diversify income
sources. Italian banks have dedicated signifi-
cant resources to developing other product
offerings such as fee-generating activities in
fund management, life insurance, securities
negotiation and consultancy. The decrease in
net interest income from 1990 to 2001 and the
concurrent increase in non-interest income are
detailed in Table 1. 
The moderate domestic economic slow-
down is not expected to significantly deterio-
rate asset quality, especially with the improve-
ment in credit-risk management and with
banks better equipped to evaluate risk through-
out all phases of credit life. The fundamental
retail and domestic nature of Italian banks has
made them less susceptible to international
fluctuations. Less than 17% of consolidated
total assets are generated abroad. (Testoni)
Even for large banks, the majority of banking
business is generated by local customers,
2The market capitalization of the Milan stock exchange
remains at a lower level than that of stock exchanges in
other major European countries.
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reflecting deep roots in the banks’ strongholds,
loyal customers and an insignificant presence
abroad. 
Italians remain underleveraged, with
financial liabilities representing only 30% of
GDP at year-end 2001, versus more than 70%
in Germany, Japan, the U.S. and the U.K. (“Bank
Industry Risk Analysis”)  The increase in the
lending rate over the past few years not only
reflects the low level of interest rates but also
the dynamism of the nation’s economy and an
environment of improving confidence. This
important aspect of growth reduces banks’ vul-
nerabilities to economic slowdown or financial
market volatility.
Above-average labor costs and low pro-
ductivity mean that Italian banking charges are
high. “There is a serious problem of over-
staffing, and it is estimated that thirty to fifty
thousand jobs need to be cut in order for effi-
ciency and profitability of the industry to
improve.” (“Banks & Other Financial
Institutions,” p. 3) An agreement between the
Italian Banking Association (ABI) and trade
unions in 1998 addressed this issue, laying the
foundation for reducing labor costs, the cre-
ation of a redundancy fund, the reform of pay
scales and the bargaining system and the intro-
duction of greater flexibility in employment
relations. (“Agreement Signed...”) Table 1 shows
a steady decline in banking staff costs, enhanc-
ing the system’s competitive position.     
Another factor favoring the competitive-
ness of Italian banks is improved management
expertise. With privatization, there has been a
heightened sensitivity towards profitability
issues. A new breed of managers more interna-
tionally educated and oriented to market needs
is able to further the competitive nature of their
banks. Finally, privatization and less political
interference give banks easier access to capital.
All these factors should lead to a stronger
Italian banking system.
Barriers to International Competition
Despite globalization and Europeanization
intensifying in recent years, convergence of the
banking sector has not occurred to a large
extent in Italy. EU directives require Italy to lift
many of its transnational banking barriers in
order to increase competition among banks, so
it can no longer be argued that the low level of
foreign involvement is the result of government
interference. It is, however, due to the few
short-term gains achieved by European cross-
border mergers. Cross-border merger and
acquisition activity is expensive and bank 
executives are limited by shareholders 
who are focused on quarterly performance.
(“Displacement Activity”)  Many shareholders
are impatient and demand immediate return on
Table 1
Financial Performance of Italian Banks
1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001
Net interest income (as % of total assets) 3.40 2.78 2.15 1.95 1.94 1.93
Non-interest income (as % of total assets) 1.02 0.86 1.40 1.60 1.77 1.76
Operating expenses (as % of total assets) 2.72 2.45 2.16 2.15 2.07 2.03
of which: banking staff costs 1.77 1.55 1.30 1.26 1.17 1.11
Net profit as % of capital and reserves (ROE) 10.2 1.6 7.4 9.6 11.6 8.9
Total assets (% of GDP) 120.7 142.0 146.6 147.4 153.3 155.1
Total number of employees (thousands) 337 359 346 344 343 345
Banking staff costs per employee
(thousand euros, constant prices) 54.3 57.0 54.4 53.6 53.6 52.8
Non-performing loans (as % of total loans) 5.0 9.2 8.7 7.4 5.7 4.7
Number of banks 1,156 970 921 876 861 844
Source: Bank of Italy 2001 Annual Report.
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equity after approving expansion. In cross-bor-
der mergers and acquisitions, the strategy is to
achieve a better competitive position in the
international arena leading to long-term gains
rather than profits within a quarter or even a
few years. 
In addition, Italy is less attractive to for-
eign banks looking for cross-border expansion
opportunities because of the country’s strict
labor laws and high tax rate. There are fewer
opportunities to cut overlapping branches and
employees. Strict labor laws make it difficult to
terminate employees, and with 95% of staff
salaries remaining fixed, it is difficult to use
monetary incentives to move staff towards cost-
efficient working practices. Italy’s high tax rate
also reduces potential profitability for foreign
owners.3 Finally, many of the banks are nation-
al champions harboring stubborn pride and
disdainful of merger opportunities with other
European banks. (“Scent of a Banker”) 
With that said, the Italian banking indus-
try is not completely averse to combinations
with foreign financial firms. French, German,
Spanish and Dutch institutions have taken posi-
tions in the Italian market via mergers and
international branching. Between 1990 and
2001, the number of foreign banks in Italy rose
from 37 to 74, approximately 9% of the Italian
banking system. (Bank of Italy)  At the same
time, some precocious Italian banks have start-
ed to take majority or even minority stakes in
banks located in Central Europe. Known as
strategic investors, Italian banks are building a
network of subsidiary banks in Hungary,
Croatia, Slovakia and other Central European
countries. This region is attractive to many sec-
ond-tier banks because the major institutions,
including the emerging market specialists, are
not involved in the region. The strategy of these
established multinational banks may be to wait
a few years and then acquire an Italian bank
that has already developed a strong presence in
the Central European region. (“Rogue Trader,
Rogue Parent”)
Although the presence of foreign banks in
Italy remains limited in retail banking, they are
active in the investment-banking arena. This is
an area where Italian banks historically have
been weak (with the exception of Mediobanca).
In the past decade, foreign banks have estab-
lished a key position in the country’s invest-
ment banking operations. 
Outlook
Because the presence of foreign retail
banks in Italy is limited, domestic banks have a
window of opportunity to become more com-
petitive without the threat of fierce interna-
tional competition. It is imperative for this
industry to take the opportunity to strengthen
internally through further privatizations, con-
solidations and improvement in management
techniques. In the future, top-tier Italian banks
no doubt will face intense international com-
petition if they expand abroad or if international
banks encroach into the Italian market. The
rapid shift to online banking, pressure to
enhance market value and customers’ increas-
ing preference for securities as investments may
place stress on Italian banks. Competition in
financial services will be tough. According to
Goddard et al,
In all major industrial countries, the
distinction between traditional bank-
ing activities, such as supplying
deposits and making loans, and other
capital market activities, has become
eroded. An ever increasing array of
negotiable assets, fed by a sustained
innovation process, has combined
with the use of new technologies to
support the emergence and rapid
growth of money and financial 
markets. 
There is good news, however, for the Italian
banking industry. Foreign banks compete pri-
marily in the investment banking, asset man-
agement and wholesale subsidiaries market
engaged in Eurocurrency business. They play a
marginal role in domestic retail and corporate
banking and generally account for less than
10% of total banking sector assets. (Goddard et
al) In addition, a report by McKinsey &
Company concludes, “Customers prefer domes-
tic providers, value established brands, still
make most use of the stationary branch net-
3According to KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Survey, the
average 2002 rate for EU countries is 32.54%, whereas
Italy’s tax rate is 40.25%. The 40.25% is composed of a 36%
corporate income tax rate (IRPEG) and a basic 4.25%
regional tax (IRAP).
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work, and wish for personal advisory services.”
(Leichtfub, p. 1)   To be successful, Italian banks
must focus on enhancing their core competen-
cy of domestic retail banking before looking
towards international activities.
Global Trends
Deregulation, Europeanization and glob-
alization have had a major impact on the bank-
ing sector. Easy profits based on lending are dis-
appearing, and banks are forced to participate
in more aggressive, high-risk, high-stake activ-
ities. According to Hughes and MacDonald,
“The danger lies in being left behind, which in
turn carries with it the risk of declining mar-
ket share, reduced profitability and ultimately
being bought out as part of an ongoing wave of
consolidation.” (p. 417) The traditional busi-
ness of providing loans has become less attrac-
tive, especially with set European-wide interest
rates. The introduction of the Euro reduces
inefficiencies in the market and arbitrage
opportunities, once an easy source of profits.
With a more efficient and transparent market,
banks are earning lower margins on tradition-
al activities. 
Financial deregulation and technologic
advances worldwide lead to some banks losing
their competitive edge. There has been an ongo-
ing shift to universal banking, where a range of
financial services (e.g., commercial banking,
securities issuance and trading and selling
insurance products) is offered within the same
institution. Customers also can turn to inter-
national capital markets, the Internet and other
non-bank financial institutions for their financ-
ing needs. In addition to what has been done in
the past decade, strategic options for Italian
banks include new revenue sources, investment
banking and riskier lending. These strategies
may help Italian banks gain competitiveness
with higher profit margins, but can also sub-
stantially increase risk within the industry due
to uncertain revenue streams. 
Italian banks must consolidate, streamline
and attract sophisticated management exper-
tise in order to pursue fee-income business
more rigorously and address competition and
disintermediation. This is evident in the rev-
enue decline from net interest between 1996
and 2002. Still relatively high at the beginning
of the 1990s (on the order of 3%), income start-
ed to dissipate from the effects of intensifying
competition, financial deregulation and the
implementation of the anti-usury law. Revenues
consisting of non-interest income steadily rise,
but profitability as measured by return on equi-
ty is inconsistent, as shown in Table 1. 
Conclusion
The Italian banking industry has benefit-
ed from a series of structural changes begun in
the 1990s. Privatization, consolidation and
advancement of management techniques all
contribute to the positive process of regenera-
tion. Because of the system’s retail and domes-
tic nature, Italian banks will remain resilient to
global financial shifts. The system’s competitive
advantage lies in its regional and local presence.
(“Bank Industry Risk Analysis”) There is a
strong relationship between banks and cus-
tomers, with the personal touch an important
attribute. Italian banks will maintain control of
the majority of domestic retail banking activi-
ty in the coming years, especially because they
remain protected from cross-border mergers
and acquisitions. However, in order to gain a
competitive international position, top Italian
banks must strive to achieve the expertise nec-
essary to compete in universal banking arenas.
The ability to offer a full range of financial serv-
ices will determine if the Italian banking sys-
tem can maintain its domestic position as well
as expand beyond its national borders to
become a force in European banking. Banking
is no longer a safe, conservative business.
Aggressive growth and profitability strategies
must be established and pursued by top Italian
banks if they wish to differentiate themselves
in the high-risk global financial market.
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